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THE SELLER'S RIGHT TO RECLAIM: ANOTHER
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE AND THE BANKRUPTCY ACT?
John A. Sebert, Jr.*
I. Introduction
For years, unsecured sellers who sold goods to insolvent buyers have had
the right to reclaim those goods if the buyer committed some variety of fraud
when acquiring the goods.1 If the requisite fraud was established, reclamation
was valid against the insolvent buyer's trustee in bankruptcy on the theory
that the original transaction was voidable by the seller because of the fraud,
and because the trustee acceded to no greater title to the goods than the
buyer had.2 This right of reclamation existed even though it resulted, at least in
some cases, in preferential treatment of the unpaid seller over other unsecured
creditors of the bankrupt. Moreover, while the fraud leading to the invocation
of the right to reclaim prior to the Uniform Commercial Code was often rela-
tively clear and active, such active fraud was not always required; courts per-
mitted sellers to establish the requisite fraud by engaging in presumptions, re-
buttable in theory but not often rebutted in fact, that a buyer who makes a
purchase while he is insolvent would normally know of his financial condition and
thus commits "fraud" by making a purchase for which he knows or should know
he cannot pay.' Such decisions, by finding a tacit representation of solvency
whenever a buyer makes a purchase on credit and then permitting the use of
* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan. Associate Professor of Law, University of Ten-
nessee. The author gratefully expresses his appreciation to Wayne Christeson, Jr. (J.D., 1976,
University of Tennessee College of Law) for his valuable research assistance and suggestions.
1 See generally 4A W. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY 1 70.41 (14th ed. J. Moore 1974) [here-
inafter cited as COLLIER]; 3A R. DUESENBERG & L. KING, SALES AND BULK TRANSFERS UNDER
THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 13.03 (4) (a) (1974) [hereinafter cited as DUESENBERG
& KING]. . I % 1
2 See Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1970); 4A COLLIER 70.41.
The fundamental policy underlying the right of reclamation has been explained as
follows:
Where goods are obtained by fraud of the bankrupt, the seller may rescind the
contract of sale and reclaim them if he can identify them in the hands of the
trustee. This is on the theory that fraud renders all contracts voidable, and that
neither in law hor in morals would the trustee be justified in holding goods obtained
by the fraud of the bankrupt for the benefit of other creditors. Such creditors have
no right to profit by the fraud of the bankrupt to the wrong and injury of the party
who has been deceived and defrauded. This does not result in a preference in favor
of the seller who thus retakes goods obtained from him by fraud, because in such
case the seller retakes his own property....
Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384, 385 (4th Cir. 1928) (citations omitted).
3 Cases involving active fraud include In re A. C. Kelly & Co., 6 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y.
1933) (active concealment); Bateman v. Patterson, 212 Ga. 284, 92 S.E.2d 8 (1956) (active
concealment); In re Monson, 127 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Ky. 1955) (bad faith misrepresenta-
tion); In re Koretz, 6 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1925) (intent not to pay). See generally 4A COLLIER
ff 70.41.
Cases presuming fraud when a buyer makes a purchase while insolvent include In re
Meiselman, 105 F.2d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1939) ; California Conserving Co. v. D'Avanzo, 62 F.2d
528 (2d Cir. 1933); Manly v. Ohio Shoe Co., 25 F.2d 384 (4th Cir. 1928); In re Penn Table
Co., 26 F. Supp. 887 (S.D. W.Va. 1939); In re Paper City Mill Supply Co., 28 F.2d 115
(D. Mass. 1928); In re Gurvitz, 276 F. 931 (D. Mass. 1921).
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presumptions to establish the fraud required for reclamation, went a long way
toward creating a right of reclamation that is not much different from that
presently found in the U.C.C.
The Uniform Commercial Code sets forth the seller's right to reclaim in §
2-702." In some respects the U.C.C. makes it easier for a seller to exercise his
right of reclamation. If he acts quickly, making a demand within 10 days of the
buyer's receipt of the goods, the requirement of affirmatively establishing some
form of fraud by the buyer is eliminated. The theory, as explained in the com-
ment, is that "any receipt of goods on credit by an insolvent buyer amounts to a
tacit business misrepresentation of solvency and therefore is fraudulent ... "'
Even if the seller does not make a timely demand within the 10-day period, he
may still reclaim later6 if the buyer made a written misrepresentation of solvency
within three months prior to delivery.' Again, no affirmative proof of fraud is
necessary; reclamation is available even if the misrepresentation was innocent.8
In other respects, however, the seller's right to reclaim under U.C.C. § 2-702
is less broad than under prior law. Unless the seller acts promptly-within 10
days of the buyer's receipt of the goods-he may reclaim only if there has been a
written misrepresentation of solvency within three months prior to receipt of the
goods. Thus the right to reclaim for oral misrepresentations, or for the "tacit
misrepresentation" that some courts had previously recognized when an in-
solvent buyer purchased on credit,9 is limited to a very short period. Moreover,
under the U.C.C. the seller's right to reclaim, if exercised, is an exclusive remedy
with respect to the goods reclaimed." Thus a reclaiming seller is deprived of the
right to claim a deficiency with respect to reclaimed goods and cannot, with
respect to any such deficiency, share in the distribution of assets to the general
creditors of the bankrupt.
Despite the relatively well-settled right of the seller under prior law to re-
4 U.C.C. § 2-702 (1962 version) provides in pertinent part:
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while
insolvent he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the
receipt, but if misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in
writing within three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply.
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to
pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a
buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this
Article (Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies
with respect to them.
The 1972 version deletes "or lien creditors." See notes 29, 30 infra and accom-
panying text.
5 U.C.C. § 2-702, Comment 2 (1962 version). Some argue that the U.C.C. merely made
irrebuttable the previous rebuttable presumption of fraud. See King, Reclamation Petition
Granted: In Defense of the Defrauded Seller, 44 REF. J. 81, 82 (1970). Others claim the
U.C.C. abandons any requirement of fraud. See Countryman, Buyers and Sellers of Goods in
Bankruptcy, 1 N. MEx. L. REv. 435, 455 (1971). Further debate about such semantics hardly
seems useful.
6 Presumably the seller still would have to act with due diligence.
7 The seller probably must show that he relied on the misrepresentation. See J. WHrrE
& R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-15 (1972).
8 Some pre-Code cases also permitted a seller to reclaim if he relied on a false financial
statement even if the misrepresentation was unintentional. See Sternberg v. American Snuff Co.,
69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934).
9 See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
10 See U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
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claim goods from an insolvent buyer in many circumstances, sellers attempting to
reclaim under U.C.C. § 2-702 have been faced with numerous challenges, some
of them successful, by trustees in bankruptcy. It has been urged that the seller's
right to reclaim is voidable under the trustee's powers as a hypothetical lien
creditor.1 It has been argued that the right to reclaim is invalid as a statutory
lien under § 67(c) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act,12 or as a state-created priority
prohibited by § 64 of the Bankruptcy Act.1 3 It might also be asserted that the
light to reclaim amounts to a voidable preference.' 4 It is these arguments that
this article will address.
II. The Trustee As Lien Creditor
Under § 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act the trustee is a hypothetical lien
creditor and is vested with all the powers of a creditor of the bankrupt who
had obtained a lien upon the bankrupt's property at the date of bankruptcy.' s
The 1962 version of U.G.G. § 2-702(3) provides:
The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the
rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser or lien
creditor under this Article (Section 2-403) .... :s
The italicized language has led to the question whether the trustee, because of his
position as a hypothetical lien creditor, therefore has priority over the rights of
the reclaiming seller. An extended analysis of this particular problem, which has
been discussed by other commentators," would serve little purpose at this time.
Some consideration is necessary, however, in order to present a full picture of
the reclaiming seller's rights against the trustee in bankruptcy.
The principal difficulty in resolving the lien creditor question is that, while
U.C.G. § 2-703(3) clearly provides that the rights of the reclaiming seller are
subject to the rights of a lien creditor, that section does not indicate what the
rights of a lien creditor are or where those rights are to be found. To date, most
11 See, e.g., In re Kravitz, 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1960).
12 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (A) (1970). See, e.g., In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP.
SERV. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (in bankruptcy), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975);
In re Good Deal Supermarkets Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974).
13 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970). See In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SEav. 1142 (E.D.
Mich. 1973) (in bankruptcy), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975). See also Country-
man, supra note 5, at 452.
14 See Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970).
15 The section provides in relevant part:
The trustee shall have as of the date of bankruptcy the rights and powers of ...
a creditor who upon the date of bankruptcy obtained a lien by legal or equitable
proceedings upon all property, whether or not coming into possession or control of
the court, upon which a creditor of the bankrupt upon a simple contract could have
obtained such a lien, whether or not such a creditor exists....
Bankruptcy Act § 70(c), 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1970).
16 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962 version) (emphasis added). The 1972 version deletes
"lien creditor."
17 See, e.g., Braucher, Reclamation of Goods From a Fraudulent Buyer, 65 Micr. L. Rav.
1281 (1967); Hawkland, The Relative Rights of Lien Creditors and Defrauded Sellers-
Amending the Uniform Commercial Code to Conform to the Kravitz Case, 67 Com. L.J. 86
(1962); Kennedy, The Trustee in Bankruptcy Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 14
RuTo. U. L. Rav. 518, 549-53 (1960) ; Shanker, A Reply to the Proposed Amendment of UCC
Section 2-702(3), 14 Was. REs. L. RPv. 93 (1962).
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courts have agreed with the Third Circuit, in In re Kravitz,"8 that the rights of a
lien creditor are not to be found in U.C.C. § 2-702, or elsewhere in Article 2,
or, for that matter, anywhere in the U.C.C. Those courts have instead resorted
to non-U.C.C. state law to determine the relative priority of the reclaiming seller
and the trustee in bankruptcy in his role as hypothetical lien creditor. 9 The
result has generally been favorable for the seller; although the court in Kravitz
concluded that a lien creditor prevailed over the reclaiming seller under Penn-
sylvania law,2" courts interpreting the law of other states have, for the most part,
concluded that the reclaiming seller prevailed. 2'
These decisions result in a regrettable, but probably acceptable, lack of uni-
formity in a statute that was intended to create a uniform law of sales. A more
serious threat, at least to reclaiming sellers, is the possibility that a court might
adopt one of the interpretations of U.C.C. § 2-702 proffered by Professor
Shanker. He argued, partly from the desire to maintain uniformity, that U.C.C.
§ 2-702 is itself a priority provision subordinating the rights of reclaiming sellers
to those of lien creditors. 2 This interpretation is subject to question, however,
because it fails adequately to explain the cross-reference in U.C.C. § 2-702(3).
The right to reclaim is subject to "the rights of a buyer in the ordinary course or
other good faith purchaser or lien creditor under this Article (Section
2-403) . .,,2" This language indicates that U.C.C. § 2-702 is not itself a
priority provision and that the rights of purchasers and lien creditors are to be
found elsewhere.2 4 Shanker's interpretation-that U.C.C. § 2-702(3) itself
declares the rights of lien creditors to be superior to those of reclaiming sellers-
would make the seller's right to reclaim against an insolvent buyer almost totally
useless because that right would be ineffective against the trustee in bankruptcy.
Alternatively, Shanker argued that the right to reclaim is analogous to a
security interest and that, under U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (b)," the trustee in bank-
ruptcy, as lien creditor, would prevail over any reclaiming seller who had not
perfected his security interest as of the date of bankruptcy either by appropriate
filing or by taking possession of the goods.26 An initial difficulty with this propo-
18 278 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1960).
19 See, e.g., In re Mel Golde Shoes, 403 F.2d 658 (6th Cir. 1968); In re Royalty Homes,
Inc., 8 U.C.G. REP. SERv. 61 (Ref. E.D. Tenn. 1970).
20 278 F.2d at 820 (3d Cir. 1960).
21 See note 19 supra.
22 Shanker, supra note 17, at 97-98.
23 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962 version) (emphasis added). The 1972 version deletes "lien
creditor."
24 Professor Shanker argues that the cross-reference in § 2-702 was only for the purpose
of defining the terms, such as lien creditor and buyer in the ordinary course, used therein.
Shanker, supra note 17, at 97-98. The difficulty with this position is that the only section
referred to in U.G.C. § 2-702 is U.C.C. § 2-403. While that section does contain an explana-
tion of the rights of buyers in ordinary course, buyer in the ordinary course is defined elsewhere
(in § 1-201'(9)) and lien creditor is not mentioned in U.C.O. § 2-403. If the Code
drafters had been intending only to cross-reference definitions, they most likely would have
cited U.C.C. §§ 1-201(9) and 9-301(3) (1962 version). The latter section does contain a
definition of lien creditor.
25 U.C.C. § 9-301(1) (1962 version) provides in pertinent part:
(1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2), an inperfected security interest
is subordinate to the rights of ...
(b) a person who becomes a lien creditor without knowledge of the security interest
and before it is perfected; . ..
26 Shanker, supra note 17, at 102-06. See In re Richardson Homes Corp., 18 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 384 (N.D. Ind. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
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sition is that the seller's right to reclaim is created by statute, not by agreement
of the parties, and thus does not appear to be the type of interest covered by
Article 9, which applies to "security interests created by contract." 2 When
compared with prior law, both interpretations substantially restrict the seller's
right to reclaim. Since the official comments indicate an intention to extend the
rights of a reclaiming seller,28 it is extremely doubtful that the drafters ever
intended such a result.
In 1966 the Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code,
apparently reacting in part to the risk of nonuniformity created by the Kravitz
line of decisions and in part to the more serious threat posed by the Shanker
arguments, recommended the deletion of the offending "or lien creditor" lan-
guage from U.C.C. § 2-702 (3) .29 In states that have adopted that recommenda-
tion," sellers reclaiming under U.C.C. § 2-702 will clearly prevail over the
trustee in bankruptcy's rights as a lien creditor under § 70(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, since the trustee's rights as a lien creditor are measured by state law."
Even in states that have not deleted the "lien creditor" language from U.C.C. §
2-702, reclaiming sellers normally have prevailed over the trustee because the
courts have referred to non-U.C.C. state law, which has generally been favorable
to the reclaiming sellers, to determine the rights of lien creditors.
III. The Right to Reclaim: A Statutory Lien?
A. The Problem
By far the most serious threat to the seller's right to reclaim from an in-
solvent buyer is the possibility that the right to reclaim will be considered a
statutory lien that first becomes effective upon a debtor's insolvency. Such liens
are invalid against the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy under § 67 (c) (1) (A) of
the Bankruptcy Act.2 In a significant recent decision, In re Federal's, Inc.,4
27 U.C.C. § 9-102(2) (1962 version); see Braucher supra note 17, at 1290.
28 See U.C.C. § 2-702, Statement of Changes (1962 version).
29 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, Report No. 3, at 3 (1966).
30 For a recent listing of 15 states that have deleted the "lien creditor" language, see
Henson, Reclamation Rights of Sellers Under Section 2-702, 21 N.Y.L.F. 41, 41-42 n.2
(1975).
31 See 4A COLLIER 70.49.
32 See notes 18-21 supra and accompanying text.
33 This section provides:
The following liens shall be invalid against the trustee:(A) every statutory lien which first becomes effective upon the insolvency of
the debtor, or upon distribution or liquidation of his property, or upon execution
against his property levied at the instance of one other than the lienor; ...(B) every statutory lien which is not perfected or enforceable at the date of
bankruptcy against one acquiring the rights of a bona fide purchaser from the debtor
on that date, whether or not such vurchaser exists .
(C) every statutory lien for rent and every lien of distress for rent, whether
statutory or not. ...
11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (A)-(C) (1970).
34 12 U.C.C. REP. SEav. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (in bankruptcy), aff'd, 402 F. Supp.
1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975). On appeal, the district court held that the rights of the reclaiming
seller were subordinate to the rights of lien creditors under relevant Michigan law and that
therefore the trustee in -bankruptcy, as hypothetical lien creditor under § 70(c) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, prevailed over the seller. Id. at 1359-63. The district court also considered and
agreed with the bankruptcy judge's conclusions that the right to reclaim set forth in U.C.C. §
2-702 was invalid against the trustee as a statutory lien and as a state-created priority. Id. at
1363-68.
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a bankruptcy judge concluded that a seller's right to reclaim was invalid as a
statutory lien. Panasonic had delivered electronic entertainment equipment to
Federal's Department Stores on credit on August 10, 1972. Shortly thereafter
Federal's filed a Chapter XI petition for an arrangement and Panasonic im-
mediately sent written demands for reclamation of the equipment. Those
demands were received by Federal's and by its Chapter XI receiver on August
19, 1972," clearly within the 10-day demand period of U.C.C. § 2-702(2). In
denying Panasonic's reclamation petition, the bankruptcy judge stated that the
Code
confers upon a specified class of creditors "preferential treatment as against
the buyer's other creditors" . . . .As such it conflicts with the express
purpose of the Bankruptcy Act.
3 6
He then went on to hold that the seller's right to reclaim under U.C.C. § 2-702
amounted to a statutory lien and therefore was invalid against the trustee.
Since the decision in Federal's a number of other courts have considered the
issue, some concluding that the U.C.C. § 2-702 right to reclaim is invalid as a
statutory lien 38 and others rejecting the statutory lien argument asserted by
trustees in bankruptcy.
30
Without doubt, the key to whether the seller's right to reclaim is valid
against the trustee in bankruptcy is the determination of whether that right is a
"statutory lien." If it is, it clearly runs afoul of § 67(c) (1) (A) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act because, under that Act, a seller may reclaim only if the buyer receives
goods while insolvent; thus the right to reclaim "first becomes effective upon the
insolvency of the debtor."4 In making the crucial determination of whether the
right to reclaim is a statutory lien, one might logically look first to the Bankruptcy
Act's definition of statutory lien:
35 12 U.C.C. REP. SERv. at 1143.
36 Id. at 1151-52.
37 Id. at 1153. The bankruptcy judge relied upon In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. 620 (W.D.
La.), aff'd per curiam, 402 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nora. Bernard v. Bene-
ficial Finance Co., 394 U.S. 930 (1969) and upon In re J. R. Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188
(1st Cir. 1971). The vendor's lien statutes in those two cases, from Louisiana and Puerto Rico
respectively, were similar to each other but different from U.C.C. § 2-702 in that
they gave the vendor a preference for the value of personal property sold to the debtor for
which the debtor had not paid. The court in Trahan held that the Louisiana vendor's lien was
a statutory lien but that it was valid against the trustee because it was effective regardless of
the insolvency of the debtor and because it met the additional test of § 67(c) (1) (B) of the
Bankruptcy Act-it was valid against bona fide purchasers. In re Trahan, 283 F. Supp. at 625-
27. The court in Nieves, assuming but not deciding that the Puerto Rico vendor's lien was a
statutory lien, agreed that it did not violate § 67(c) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act because it
was effective whether or not the debtor was insolvent, but held that the Puerto Rico vendor's
lien was invalid against the trustee under § 67(c) (1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Act because the
lien was not effective against bona fide purchasers. In re J. R. Nieves, 446 F.2d at 190-94.
Nieves is curious, to say the least, in that the court purports to "assume without deciding" a
point essential to its holding. If the Puerto Rico vendor's lien statute were not a statutory
lien it could not be invalid against the trustee under § 67(c) (1) (B) of the Bankruptcy Act.
38 See In re Perskey & Wolf, Inc., - F. Supp. -, 19 UCC REP. SERv. 812 '(N.D. Ohio
1976); In re Giltex, Inc., - F. Supp. -, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
In re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Wetson's Corp.,
17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
39 See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Holzman v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976); In re National Bellas Hess,
Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
40 11 U.S.C. § 107(c)(1)(A) (1970). Professor Henson appears to argue that, evenif the
U.C.C. § 2-702 right to reclaim is a statutory lien, it would not be invalid. He states that the
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"Statutory lien" shall mean a lien arising solely by force of statute
upon specified circumstances or conditions, but shall not include any lien
provided by or dependent upon an agreement to give security, whether or not
such lien is also provided by or is also dependent upon statute and whether
or not the agreement or lien is made fully effective by statute.41
This definition is an example of a cardinal error of draftsmanship-using the
term that is to be defined (lien) in the definition. The definition does make it
clear that consensual security interests, such as those provided for in Article 9 of
the U.C.C., are not encompassed within the term "statutory lien," but beyond
that'it is of little help. 2
B. The Legislative History of § 67(c) of the Bankruptcy Act
The legislative history of § 67 (c), although far from conclusive, is at least
more useful. The present version of § 67(c) was added to the Bankruptcy Act in
1966. 43 The committee report contained the following explanation of the pro-
vision in § 67 (c) (1 ) (A) invalidating statutory liens that first become effective on
insolvency:
The first of these provisions strikes at liens which merely determine the
order of distribution upon insolvency or liquidation. This kind of lien is
not a specific property right which may be asserted independently of a
general distribution and regardless of the transfer of the property. This is
clearly a disguised priority."
4
seller's right becomes effective immediately upon the buyer's receipt of goods on credit while
insolvent and that it therefore does not "become effective only at the date the bankruptcy
petition is filed." Henson, supra note 30, at 52. The difficulty with this argument is that the
Bankruptcy Act invalidates statutory liens that first become effective upon insolvency rather
than upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition. One is insolvent under the Bankruptcy Act when
his debts exceed the fair value of his property, and this normally occurs some time prior to the
filing of a petition in bankruptcy. See Bankruptcy Act § 1(19), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (19) (1970).
Professor Henson also seems to suggest that the reclamation right under the U.C.C. might
be saved because its definition of insolvency is broader than that of the Bankruptcy Act, in-
cluding not only the Bankruptcy Act test but also inability to pay debts as they come due
and failure to pay debts in the ordinary course of business. See U.C.C. § 1-201(23) (1962
version). Thus he appears to urge that the right to reclaim under the U.C.C., even if a
statutory lien, is not one which becomes effective only upon insolvency as defined in the
Bankruptcy Act. Henson, supra note 30, at 52. It is doubtful that a court, once it concluded
that a lien was a statutory lien within the policy of § 67 (c), would permit that policy to be
avoided by the simple expedient of having a slightly different definition of insolvency than
that found in the Bankruptcy Act. Moreover, Professor Henson ignores § 67(c) (1) (B) of
the Bankruptcy Act, which invalidates all statutory liens that are not perfected at the date of
bankruptcy against bona fide purchasers. 11 U.S.C. § 107(c) (1) (B) (1970). The seller's
right to reclaim under U.C.C. § 2-702 is expressly made subject to the rights of bona fide
purchasers. See English v. Ralph Williams Ford, 17 Cal. App.3d 1038, 1047-48, 95 Cal. Rptr.
501, 506 (1971). Thus as long as the U.C.C. § 2-702 right is considered a statutory lien it
would be invalid against the trustee even if one accepted the tenuous argument that it is not
a lien that first becomes effective upon insolvency.
41 Bankruptcy Act § 1(29a), 11 U.S.C. § 1(29a) (1970).
42 It has been said that the definition is primarily a definition of "statutory" rather than
of "lien." See King, Statutory Liens Under New § 6 7(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, 42 REPF. J. 11,
12 (1968).
43 Act of July 5, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-495, § 4, 80 Stat. 268 (1966). For a general
discussion of the treatment of statutory liens prior to 1966 and of the 1966 amendments, see
Seligson, Treatment of Statutory Liens in Bankruptcy-The 1966 Amendments of Section 67(b)
and (c), 27 FED. B. J. 111 (1967).
44 S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in, [1966] U.S. CoDE CONG.
& ADMIN. Nzws 2456, 2461.
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This language has been relied upon by some to demonstrate that the U.C.C. §
2-702 right to reclaim should be considered a statutory lien.45 It is obvious that
labels ought not be conclusive; the mere fact that the drafters of the U.G.G. did
not denominate the U.C.C. § 2-702 right a "lien" ought not to save it from the
application of § 67(c)6 On the other hand, the quoted language from the
committee report does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the seller's right
of reclamation is a statutory lien. Instead, the passage seems to suggest a dis-
tinction between "specific property rights" and priorities in the distribution of
assets upon insolvency. There is other language in the report that further sup-
ports a distinction between priority provisions and property interests, evidencing
a desire to invalidate the former but to preserve the latter. In discussing the
inadequacies of the then-existing version of § 67(c), which postponed statutory
liens on personal property that were not accompanied by possession, the com-
mittee stated:
It will be recalled that one of the major objectives of the Chandler
Act was to overcome the distortion of the Federal order of distribution by
the creation of spurious statutory liens.... However, a recent reexamination
of State lien statutes has shown that neither the standard of possession nor
the distinction between real and personal property is an entirely satisfactory
criterion. Some liens which are genuine property rights are affected and
others which were essentially State-created priorities escape.47
It is submitted that the seller's right to reclaim under U.C.C. § 2-702 is
much more akin to the "property right" which the committee desired to preserve
than to the state-created priority in the distribution of the bankrupt's assets
which the committee wished to invalidate. It appears that the "liens" about
which the committee was concerned were liens, such as landlords' liens, wage
liens, and tax liens, that attach to all or large portions of a bankrupt's property
and that therefore present grave risks of seriously depleting the bankrupt's
estate at the expense of the unsecured creditors. The seller's right to reclaim is
45 Countryman, supra note 5, at 444. Professor Countryman uses the cited excerpt while
arguing that the buyer's right, under U.C.C. § 2-502, to replevy from an insolvent seller
goods for which he has paid all or part of the price amounts to a statutory lien. He later says,
however, that he believes the same arguments apply to the seller's right to reclaim under
U.C.C. § 2-702. Id. at 452.
A full discussion of the buyer's right under U.C.C. § 2-502 is beyond the scope of this
article. It can be pointed out, however, that the buyer's U.C.C. § 2-502 rights at least are some-
what different from the seller's right to reclaim. The seller is able to remove from the bankrupt
estate only the asset that he contributed to the estate whereas the buyer is given priority not to
the asset he contributed (presumably money) but to the goods that he bought, which may have
been created in part from the money that he contributed but to which many other unsecured
creditors of the debtor, such as employees and suppliers, also may have contributed. Moreover,
even if the buyer's rights under U.C.C. § 2-502 are invalid as a statutory lien, little is lost.
The buyer's U.C.C. § 2-502 rights are almost entirely illusory under the provisions of the U.C.C.
itself because he has a right to replevy the goods for which he has paid only if the seller
"becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first installment on their price." U.C.C.
§ 2-502(1) (1962 version). It will be a rare instance where a buyer can show that the seller
actually became insolvent during the short 10-day period after receipt of the first payment
from the buyer.
46 In at least this respect I agree with Professor Countryman. See Countryman, supra note
5, at 444.
47 S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADmuN. NEws 2456, 2460-61 (emphasis added).
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not such a lien. It attaches only to the particular assets that the seller has con-
tributed to the bankrupt's estate and for which the bankrupt has not paid. The
unpaid seller is given no priority in the distribution of any other assets. More-
over, the right of reclamation, if exercised, is the seller's exclusive remedy with
respect to the goods reclaimed.4 By reclaiming, the seller gives up, any right to
claim a deficiency against the bankrupts estate (such as damages for the excess
of contract price over resale price49 or for lost profits") and therefore gives up
the right to receive any further distribution on account of that claim.51 Thus
a seller reclaiming goods under U.C.C. § 2-702 will not be able to deplete the
assets of the bankrupt estate beyond the specific assets that he contributed to that
estate. The reclaiming seller, therefore, does not present the same risk of deplet-
ing all of the assets of the estate that is presented by the holders of liens that
attach to broad ranges of the bankrupt's property.
There is further support in the legislative history of § 67(c) for the thesis
that the right to reclaim is not the type of "lien" encompassed by the statute. In
1952 Congress enacted the present definition of statutory lien and a version of
§ 67(c) that postponed statutory liens on personal property that were not ac-
companied by possession. 2 In explaining those changes, the House Report stated:
Liens on personal property unaccompanied by possession, however, are of
the nature of "floating liens," which attach to all a debtor's personalty,
although the property he owns is commonly changing from day to day. If
any provisions for priority were labeled a "lien," such a lien would be
indistinguishable from floating liens on personal property.
There is accordingly reason to restrict such liens to the same extent that
priorities are restricted. s
Thus, at least in 1952, when the definition of statutory lien was inserted in the
Bankruptcy Act, it was thought that the principal problem with statutory liens
was that they attached to all of the debtor's property and were, essentially, floating
liens.5" Although the substance of § 67(c) was changed in 1966, the definition
of statutory lien has not been altered. In addition, while the committee reports in
1966 do not explicitly repeat the 1952 description of a statutory lien as one at-
taching to all of the debtor's property, all of the cases cited in the reports of the
Senate and House judiciary committees involved the types of liens that normally
do attach to all, or broad ranges of, the debtor's property, such as landlord liens
48 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
49 This measure of damages is normally available under U.C.C. § 2-706 (1962 version).
50 Lost profits are recoverable under U.C.C. § 2-708(2) (1962 version) in appropriate
circumstances, such as if the seller was a lost volume seller.
51 Others have noted this difference between U.C.C. § 2-702 and ordinary liens. See
Note, U.C.C. § 2-702: Conflict With § 67c(Z) (A) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act, 53 N.C.
L. Rav. 169, 175-76 (1974).
52 Act of July 7, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-456, § 21(d), 66 Stat. 420, 427 (1952).
53 H. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952), reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD IN. NEws 1960, 1973.
54 It is also significant that the Congress' initial attempt to deal with statutory liens, by
postponing some statutory liens under § 67(c) of the Act of 1938, was prompted in part by
studies showing that tax and rent liens often took up large portions of the bankrupt estates.
See 4 COLLtER 67.20(3).
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and wage and tax liens." Finally, there is no mention in the 1966 committee
reports of the seller's right to reclaim, and certainly no indication that the right
to reclaim under U.C.G. § 2-702 was thought to be a statutory lien. If Congress
had intended to call into question the seller's right to reclaim, which had been
recognized in many circumstances under prior law,56 one would expect to find
some mention of that intention in the committee reports.
While the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Act's treatment of statutory
liens is far from conclusive, it is significant that there is in the committee reports
no indication that the seller's right to reclaim would be affected by the provisions
relating to statutory liens. In addition, the reports contain relatively strong
evidence that, in the statutory lien provisions, Congress was concerned with types
of creditor remedies that are significantly different from the seller's right to
reclaim, that is, with liens such as tax and landlord liens that attach to broad
classes of the bankrupt's property and that present a substantial risk of seriously
depleting the assets of the bankrupt estate. Thus the legislative history at least
appears to provide some support for the position that the seller's right to reclaim
is not a statutory lien under § 67(c) (1) (A) of the Bankruptcy Act.
C. Policy Considerations
Numerous important considerations of history and policy also support this
conclusion. If the U.C.C. § 2-702 right to reclaim is a statutory lien, the ex-
pansion under the U.C.C. of the right to reclaim, by eliminating the need to
prove fraud, would be affected. Also, the right to reclaim would be called into
question in situations where that right had been firmly established prior to the
U.C.C., such as when an insolvent buyer purchases goods on credit intending
never to pay for them.57 The seller's right to reclaim in this clearly fraudulent
situation is also covered by U.C.C. § 2-702, and the U.C.C. does not distinguish
between such situations and ones, such as in Federal's, in which a buyer, though
insolvent, purchases without any affirmative misrepresentation of his financial
situation and with full intention to pay."8 If the right to reclaim set forth in
U.C.C. § 2-702 is invalid as a statutory lien in the latter situation, would it not
55 The report of the Senate Judiciary Committee essentially quoted the earlier report of
the House Judiciary Committee. See H. REP. No. 136, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). All of the
cases cited in the Senate Judiciary Committee report were in the quotation from the House
Report. See S. REP. No. 1159, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2456. The cases cited were: In re Einhorn Bros., Inc., 272 F.2d 434 (3d
Cir. 1959) (distraint for rent); Rochell v. City of Dallas, 264 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1959) (state tax
lien); In re Quaker City Uniform Co., 238 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1956) (lien for rent); Cali-
fornia State Dept. of Employ. v. United States, 210 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1954) (state tax lien);
City of New Orleans v. Harrell, 134 F.2d 399 (5th Cir. 1943) (city tax lien); In re Eakin
Lumber Co., 39 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. W.Va. 1941), aff'd sub nom. Reconstruction Finance
Corp. v. Sun Lumber Co., 126 F.2d 731 (4th Cir. 1942) (wage lien).
56 For a discussion of the seller's right to reclaim under pre-U.C.C. law, and of the suc-
cess in asserting that right against the trustee in bankruptcy, see notes 1-3 supra and ac-
companying text.
57 See, e.g., In re Koretz, 6 F.2d 225 (7th Cir. 1925).
58 See In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. REP. SaRv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (in bank-
ruptcy), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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also be invalid in the former?"' Before reaching a result that thus raises such
serious questions about a right to reclaim that has been firmly established for
years, more careful attention to the policies of the Bankruptcy Act and the
U.C.C. is required than has been given by the courts which have concluded that
the seller's right to reclaim is invalid as a statutory lien.
In analyzing the underlying policy considerations, it is first important to re-
emphasize the limited nature of the seller's right to reclaim under the U.C.C.
Section 2-702 permits the seller to recover only the asset that he has contributed
to the estate. This crucial point, which constitutes the most significant difference
between the right of reclamation and the liens with which Congress was primarily
concerned, has largely been ignored in the cases.e° The advantage to the re-
claiming seller is further limited, as previously indicated, by the fact that rec-
lamation, if elected, is the seller's exclusive remedy with respect to the reclaimed
goods; he may not also file a claim for a deficiency as an unsecured creditor.6
In addition, the right to reclaim is short-lived. Unless there has been a
written misrepresentation of solvency made within three months prior to delivery,
reclamation must be demanded within 10 days after buyer's receipt of the
goods.62 The short 10-day period reduces significantly one potential source of
prejudice to other creditors of the buyer-the possibility that a creditor will have
lent money or otherwise acted in reliance on buyer's possession of the goods that
seller is attempting to reclaim. The likelihood of such reliance by a creditor
within the 10-day period may be minimal, and in any event a careful creditor
could partially protect himself from reclamation by waiting to rely on such goods
until buyer had had them for more than 10 days. Admittedly, some risk would
remain even after the end of the 10-day period: the goods could still be re-
claimed if a written misrepresentation of solvency had been made to the seller
within three months prior to delivery.63 But an intervening creditor probably ran
the risk of reclamation in the case of such misrepresentation even before the
U.C.C.6 1
Finally, the seller's right to reclaim is expressly subject to the rights of good
faith purchasers,6" which has been correctly held to include not only buyers but
59 U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1962 version) purports to state the only basis for reclamation
from an insolvent buyer:
Except as provided in this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods
on the buyer's fraudulent or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
Id. Thus it might be argued that a seller could not fall back upon any common law rights to
reclaim from a fraudulent buyer. Some courts, however, have attempted to preserve the com-
mon law reclamation rights by interpreting U.C.C. § 2-702(2) as the sole basis of reclamation
only if that section is not invalidated by the trustee in bankruptcy. See In re Giltex, Inc., -
F. Supp. -, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 887, 896 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C.
REP. SRV. 423, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
60 One court did recognize the possibility that Congress might have intended only to in-
validate statutory liens that attach to broad categories of a debtor's assets but ultimately con-
cluded that Congress intended to invalidate both such broad liens and any lien that became
effective on insolvency. See In re Giltex, - F. Supp. -, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 887 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). The court failed.' to place sufficient emphasis on the fact that the right of reclamation
attaches not just to a specific asset but to the very asset contributed to the estate by the seller.
61 See notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text.
62 U.C.C. § 2-702(2) (1962 version).
63 Id.
64 See, e.g., Sternberg v. American Snuff Co., 69 F.2d 307 (8th Cir. 1934); In re
Monson, 127 F. Supp. 625 (W.D. Ky. 1955); In re Tate-Jones & Co., 85 F. Supp. 971 (W.D.
Pa. 1949).
65 U.C.C. § 2-702(3) (1962 version).
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also holders of security interests in the goods being reclaimed.6" Thus any creditor
who relies on goods recently acquired by a buyer could protect himself from
reclamation by obtaining a security interest in those goods under Article 9 .11
The persons most likely to be affected by reclamation are the vast bulk of
unsecured creditors who have not relied in any meaningful way on the buyer's
possession of the goods being reclaimed but who, it is argued, are prejudiced
because reclamation reduces the assets of the bankrupt estate and thus reduces the
amount available for distribution to the general creditors. It is said that reclama-
tion gives the seller preferential treatment over other creditors who are similarly
situated and that the other creditors are unfairly prejudiced." While reclamation
undoubtedly gives the seller preferential treatment, it is submitted that that
preference is, on balance, justified. If the seller is not permitted to reclaim, the
goods that he sold the bankrupt will be retained in the estate for the benefit of all
of the unsecured and non-relying creditors. It might be more appropriate in those
circumstances to ask what policies justify permitting the unsecured creditors to
benefit, at the expense of the seller, from goods that the seller sold to the bankrupt
while he was insolvent and that otherwise would not have been in the bankrupt
estate. As long as there are provisions, as there are in the U.C.C., to reduce the
risk of prejudice to creditors who might have actually relied on the buyer's
possession of the goods, it seems that the equities are with the seller.
Professor Countryman responds to this argument by suggesting that, if the
seller of goods has a right to reclaim, it is difficult to justify the different treatment
of those who lend money or render services on credit to an insolvent but do not
have a similar right to reclaim.69 The distinction that Professor Countryman
ignores is that it would be much more difficult, if not impossible, to structure a
right to "reclamation" for a lender or one who renders services that did not
involve substantially more serious prejudice to the rights of other creditors. Rec-
lamation of goods results in the return to the seller of goods sold. Return in
specie would be impossible for services rendered to the bankrupt. If one who
rendered services were to be given some sort of reclamation right, it would have
to be either a right to the value of the services or to the product that his services
helped create. The latter solution would create potentially serious problems of
66 See, e.g., In re Daley, Inc., 17 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 433 (D. Mass. 1975) (in bankruptcy);
First-'Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Academic Archives, Inc., 179 S.E.2d 850 (N.C. App. 1971).
The definition of purchase under the U.C.C., which includes the taking by "mortgage, pledge,
lien . . . or any other voluntary transaction creating an interest in property," is clearly broad
enough to include a security interest, and a purchaser is defined as one who takes by purchase.
See U.C.C. §§ 1-201(32), (33) '(1962 version).
67 It probably is not even necessary that the security interest be perfected in order to
prevail over a reclaiming seller. U..C. § 9-201 (1962 version) provides that security agree-
ments are effective according to their terms unless otherwise provided in the U.C.C., and re-
claiming sellers are not listed in U.C.C. § 9-301 (1962 version) as a type of party who prevails
over the holder of an unperfected security interest. In an analogous situation, one court has
held that the holder of an unperfected security interest in an automobile had priority over a
seller attempting to reclaim under U.C.C. §§ 2-507 and 2-511, which give a seller the right to
reclaim goods in a "cash sale" if they are delivered in return for payment by check and the
check is dishonored. Guy Martin Buick, Inc. v. Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 511 P.2d 912
(Colo. App. 1973).
68 See, e.g., Bjornstad, Reclamation of Goods by Unsecured Sellers in Bankruptcy Pro-
ceedings, 24 DaAxE L. Rav. 357, 363 (1975).
69 Countryman, supra note 5, at 455. Some courts have also questioned why sellers should
be singled out for favorable treatment. See In re Wetson's Corp., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 423,
427 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
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prejudice to others whose services or goods might also have contributed to the
final product. On the other hand, since an attempt to place a value on services
is always a somewhat speculative undertaking, permitting one to "reclaim" the
value of services rendered to an insolvent would always involve a risk that the
services would be overvalued, thus prejudicing other creditors by reducing the
bankrupt estate by more than the value of the services rendered."0 As for the loan
analogy, it might be easier to return money lent to an insolvent, if the money can
be identified through some form of tracing, but money received by an insolvent
is much more likely than goods to be relied upon by other creditors who would
then be prejudiced if the lender were given a right of reclamation. This is not to
say that there necessarily are no circumstances in which it would be appropriate
to give a lender or one who rendered services a right of reclamation. But it does
suggest that additional difficulties are created that provide a rational basis for a
legislature to conclude that sellers should have a right to reclaim while lenders
and persons who render services should not.
Finally, critics of the U.C.C. § 2-702 right of reclamation often point out
that a seller can always assure himself of the right to recover goods from an in-
solvent buyer by taking and perfecting a purchase-money security interest in the
goods sold.7 The seller's right of reclamation is thus depicted as providing pro-
tection primarily for the careless and indolent. In many circumstances this char-
acterization would be both inaccurate and unfair. Many sales between merchants
are made on short-term credit of 30 or 60 days or less, and sellers frequently
make such short-term credit sales without taking a security interest. Taking a
security interest would involve various costs, including payment of filing fees,
effort to prepare security agreements and financing statements, and delay in con-
summating sales. These costs, although possibly minor in any single transaction,
could well be significant in the aggregate and in many situations would not be
justified in light of the minimal risk of nonpayment normally incurred. Thus
the extension of short-term unsecured credit is a reasonable and important
mercantile practice. U.C.C. § 2-702 is an attempt to provide some minimal
protection for unsecured sellers in the unusual situation where they are unpaid
because their buyer was insolvent when the goods were received.72
70 In addition to the general vagaries of measuring the value of services, by what standard
would that value be measured? One typical measure would be the cost of obtaining similar
services at the time they were rendered. But that cost might be significantly different from,
and often more than, the increase in the value of the bankrupt estate attributable to those
services. For example, a contractor might do home improvement work "worth" (in the sense
of cost of obtaining similar services) $1,000, but that work might increase the market value of
the home by only $800. If the contractor were given a "right of reclamation" based on the
$1,000 value of his services, other creditors would be prejudiced because the estate would be
depleted by more than the $800 increased market value attributable to the work. A solution
might be to measure the reclamation right by the increase in the value of the estate attributable
to the work rendered ($800 in the example), but value in that sense is even more difficult to
estimate accurately than is the cost of obtaining similar services.
71 Countryman, supra note 5, at 451.
72 The Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States apparently agrees,
although its report was substantially completed prior to the decision in In re Federal's. Section
4-606 of the Commission's proposed new Bankruptcy Act, which invalidates certain statutory
and common-law liens, contains an express exception preserving any lien
(1) which secures a debt incurred for the repair, preservation, shipment, storage,
manufacture, or improvement of... property of the estate.
REPORT OF THE COmim'N ON BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H. R. Doc. No. 93-
137, 93d Cong., Ist Sess., pt. II, at 164-66 (1973). The Commission's note cited In re J. R.
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IV. The Right to Reclaim: A State-Created Priority?
Another way to attack the seller's right to reclaim, closely connected with
the argument that reclamation is invalid as a statutory lien, is to assert that the
right to reclaim is a state-created priority in violation of § 64(a) of the
Bankruptcy Act,7" which establishes priorities for the distribution of the bankrupt
estate and which invalidates all priorities created by state law except certain
priorities for landlords. 4 Most of the arguments presented in relation to statutory
liens are also applicable to the claim that the right to reclaim amounts to a state-
created priority. Bankruptcy courts have long recognized the seller's right to
reclaim from an insolvent buyer who committed various types of "fraud" and
have not considered that right to be an invalid state-created priority." The ex-
pansion of the right to reclaim under the U.C.C., primarily by permitting recla-
mation without an affirmative showing of fraud, is not so significant as to justify
a different result. Moreover, § 64 governs priorities in the distribution of the
assets of the bankrupt estate, and the right to reclaim is not such a priority. It is
more accurately considered a specific property interest in goods sold to the in-
solvent buyer, a type of property interest that the Congress intended to preserve."'
In fact, the right to reclaim is essentially a right to rescind the contract with the
buyer and retake the goods. As one court recently pointed out in rejecting the
argument that U.C.C. § 2-702 is invalid as a state-created priority, nothing in
the Bankruptcy Act prevents a state from expanding the grounds for rescission
of a contract beyond those provided at common law."
Nieves & Co., 446 F.2d 188 (1st Cir. 1971), which invalidated the Puerto Rico vendor's lien,
and appears intended to preserve both the Puerto Rico vendor's lien and the seller's right to
reclaim from attack as a statutory lien. It would have been preferable, however, if a term
broader than "manufacture" had been used in the proposed statute. For a discussion of
Nieues, see note 37 supra.
The tentative draft of the proposed Bankruptcy Act presently being considered by the
House Judiciary Committee would clearly validate the U.C.C.'s 10-day right of reclamation,
although it appears to leave open to question the right to reclaim beyond 10 days when there
is a misrepresentation of solvency. Section 546(b) of the proposed Act provides:
The rights and powers of the trustee under sections 544, 545, and 547 of this
title are subject to any statutory or common-law right of a seller, in the ordinary
course of such seller's business, of goods to the debtor to reclaim such goods if the
debtor has received such goods on credit while insolvent, but such a seller may not
reclaim any such goods unless such seller demands reclamation of such goods within
ten days after receipt of such goods by the debtor.
H.R. 6, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 546(b) (1977).
73 11 U.S.C. § 104 (1970).
74 Both the bankruptcy judge and the district court concluded in Federal's that U.C.C. §
2-702 was also invalid as a state-created priority. See In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C. Rap.
SERv. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (in bankruptcy), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
See also Bjornstad, supra note 68, at 367-68; Countryman, supra note 5, at 444, 452. There
have been other decisions invalidating various state liens as state-created priorities, but the liens
in question were broad ones attaching to large portions of the bankrupts' assets. See Elliott v.
Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Schutzbank v. Elliott, 385 U.S. 829
(1966); N.W. Day Supply Co. v. Valenti, 343 F.2d 756 (1st Cir. 1965).
75 See notes 1-3 supra and accompanying text.
76 See notes 43-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative history
of the statutory lien provisions, which reflects a congressional purpose to preserve property
rights and to invalidate only true priorities. Professor Braucher also concluded that the seller's
right to reclaim is an interest in property and not a priority violative of § 64(a). See Braucher,
supra note 17, at 1295-96.
77 See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 766 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Holzman v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976).
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V. The Right to Reclaim: A Voidable Preference?
It is easy to see how one might argue that the seller's right to reclaim would,
in appropriate circumstances, amount to a voidable preference under § 60 of the
Bankruptcy Act." A voidable preference is a transfer of nonexempt property
made or suffered by the bankrupt for or on account of an antecedent debt within
four months of bankruptcy to or for the benefit of a creditor and while the debtor
was insolvent, if the effect of the transfer was to enable the transferee to obtain a
greater percentage of his debt than other creditors of the same class and if the
transferee, at the time of the transfer, had reasonable cause to believe that the
debtor was insolvent."' Although it would appear possible to fit the right to
reclamation within this definition, the major commentators are in almost unan-
imous agreement that the seller's right to reclaim normally is not a voidable
preference.8"
The justification for this result traditionally proffered in the cases is that
when the seller reclaims there is no transfer from a debtor to a creditor. The
buyer never had title since the goods were not his until he paid for them."- One
writer has recently suggested that this argument is no longer valid because, under
U.C.C. § 2-401(2), title passes to the buyer on delivery, absent an explicit con-
trary agreement.8 2 This change in the rules relating to passage of title, however,
should not lead to the conclusion that the right to reclaim is now a voidable
preference. The title retention argument made in the cases was always somewhat
fictional since, even under pre-U.G.C. law, a buyer on open credit had effective
title for most purposes, although that title was voidable in some circumstances
by a reclaiming seller. Essentially the same situation presently exists under the
U.C.C., although the term "voidable title" is not used expressly. 3 Moreover,
the fundamental basis of the general agreement that reclamation is not a voidable
preference is the realization that other creditors normally are not unfairly
prejudiced when a seller reclaims goods for which he has not been paid; on the
contrary, permitting other creditors to benefit from goods delivered but not paid
for would in fact be unfair to the seller.84 These facts are not affected by any
78 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
79 Id. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, supra note 7, § 24-4.
80 See, e.g., 3 'COLLIER, supra note 1, 60.18 at 843-44; 3A DUESENBERG & KING, supra
note 1, § 13.03(4) (d) (iv), at 13-43-44; MAcLACHLAN, BANKRUPTCY 307 (1956).
81 See, e.g., Ullman v. N. Sobel, Inc., 47 F.2d 612, 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1931); Fisher v.
Shreve, Crump & Low Co., 7 F.2d 159 (D. Mass. 1925).
82 Bjornstad, supra note 68, at 364.
83 See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761, 765 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied
sub nom. Holzman v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976). In this case the court
held that, because the buyer's title was in effect voidable, there would be no transfer on
account of an antecedent debt and therefore the seller's right to reclaim could not be a void-
able preference. 524 F.2d at 764.
84 Professor King has stated the argument this way:
The delivery of the goods is usually in contemplation of immediate or nearly im-
mediate payment without knowledge of the buyer's inability to pay. Had the buyer
performed, there would have been no diminution of his estate because of that which
was obtained by it; to create a voidable preference because of the inability to pay
would be to give the general creditors an unnecessary windfall marked by the
proceeds obtained from the sale of the delivered goods.
King, Voidable Preferences and the Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CORNELL L. Q. 925, 939
n. 53 (1967).
Obviously the situation is reversed, and other creditors might be seriously prejudiced, if the
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modifications of the technical rules concerning passage of title.
VI. Conclusion
Although bankruptcy courts have long recognized the right of a seller in
many circumstances to reclaim goods sold to an insolvent buyer, the current
version of the seller's right to reclaim, embodied in U.C.C. § 2-702, has been
subject to attack on many fronts. The most recent and serious challenges have
been in the form of assertions, accepted by some courtss and rejected by others,"8
that the U.C.C. § 2-702 right of reclamation is invalid against the trustee in
bankruptcy as a statutory lien or a state-created priority. Challenges to the
seller's right to reclaim are certainly understandable, for reclamation does, to
some extent, give a seller preferential treatment over other unsecured creditors
of the bankrupt. This article, however, has attempted to demonstrate that, when
viewed in light of the legislative history and the policies of the Bankruptcy Act,
the seller's right to reclaim is not a statutory lien within the prohibitions of § 67
and does not contravene other provisions of the Bankruptcy Act. On the con-
trary, the reclamation right found in U.C.C. § 2-702 is a reasonable one. It does
not unfairly prejudice other creditors of the bankrupt buyer and affords only
minimal protection for sellers who sell on short-term unsecured credit-a com-
mon and important commercial practice-and who are unpaid because their
buyer was insolvent when the goods were delivered.
seller fails to reclaim within the 10-day period of U.C.C. § 2-702 or to reclaim quickly after
discovery of a written misrepresentation of solvency that eliminates the 10-day limitation on
reclamation. If a seller fails to act promptly, a later attempt at reclamation may well be held
a voidable preference. See In re Colacci's of America, Inc., 490 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1974)
(reclamation amounts to voidable preference when seller permitted buyer to retain goods for
four months after learning of buyer's inability to pay).
85 See In re Perskey & Wolf, Inc., - F. Supp. -, 19 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 812 (N.D. Ohio
1976); In re Gitex, Inc., - F. Supp. -, 17 U.C.C. REP. SERV. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); In
re Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc., 384 F. Supp. 887 (D.N.J. 1974); In re Wetson's Corp., 17
U.C.C. REP. SERv. 423 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in bankruptcy); In re Federal's, Inc., 12 U.C.C.
REP. SERV. 1142 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (in bankruptcy), aff'd, 402 F. Supp. 1357 (E.D. Mich.
1975).
86 See In re Telemart Enterprises, Inc., 524 F.2d 761 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied sub
nom. Holzman v. Alfred M. Lewis, Inc., 96 S. Ct. 1466 (1976). In re National Bellas Hess,
Inc., 17 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (in bankruptcy).
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